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Cost and benefit including value of
life and limb
measured in time units

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Standard expected loss function example

$$L(\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n, \mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) = c(\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n, \mu_1, \dots, \mu_n) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i \mu_i - \frac{g}{\gamma}$$

Preference equilibrium between work time and free time in good health

Time value modeling

$$G = pS = pw(S/w)$$

Weber-Fechner law










logarithmic relation

$$c(r) \frac{d(pw/r)}{pw/r} + [1 - c(r)] \frac{d(1 - w/r)}{1 - w/r} = 0$$

$$\left(\frac{c(r)}{w/r} - \frac{1 - c(r)}{1 - w/r} \right) d(w/r) = -\frac{c}{p} dp$$

$$p(w/r, r) = p_{\min} \frac{(1 - w/r)^{1-1/c(r)} (w/r)^{-1}}{(1 - c(r))^{1-1/c(r)} c(r)^{-1}}$$

$$w = c + a e^{-b(t-1948)} \rightarrow c \text{ as } t \rightarrow \infty$$




The time reduction factor r and the wealth index I_r

$$\frac{dI_r}{I_r} = V(r) \left[c(r) \frac{d(pw/r)}{pw/r} + [1 - c(r)] \frac{d(1 - w/r)}{1 - w/r} \right] \quad (6)$$

$$\begin{aligned} I_r &= J(r) \left[\left(p \frac{w}{r} \right)^{c(r)} \left(1 - \frac{w}{r} \right)^{1-c(r)} \right]^{V(r)} \\ &= J(r) \exp \left\{ V(r) \left[c(r) \log \left(p \frac{w}{r} \right) + [1 - c(r)] \log \left(1 - \frac{w}{r} \right) \right] \right\} \quad (7) \end{aligned}$$

$$c(r_0) = c/r_0$$



Invariance principle

$$\text{experienced worth of } d(rE) = V(r) \frac{d(rE)}{rE} = V(r) \left[\frac{dr}{r} + \frac{dE}{E} \right] \quad (8)$$

differentiation of (7) under constant w

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dI_r}{I_r} = & V(r)c(r) \frac{dp}{p} + V(r) \left\{ c'(r) \log \left(\frac{pw}{r-w} \right) - c(r) \frac{1}{r-w} + \frac{w}{r(r-w)} \right. \\ & \left. + \frac{V'(r)}{V(r)} \left[c(r) \log \left(p \frac{w}{r} \right) + [1 - c(r)] \log \left(1 - \frac{w}{r} \right) \right] + \frac{J'(r)}{J(r)} \right\} dr \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

adding (8) and (9) and setting to zero

$$-\frac{dp}{p} = \frac{1}{c(r)} \frac{dE}{E} + \left[\frac{1 - c(r)}{r - w} + c'(r) \log \left(\frac{pw}{r - w} \right) \right] \frac{dr}{c(r)} \quad (10)$$

$$d(I_r r E) / (I_r r E) = 0$$

Life Quality Time Allocation Index (LQTAI) $I_r r E$

For the actual value r_0 of r and the stationary state where $w = c$ and $p = p_{\min}$

$$-\frac{dp}{p_{\min}} = \frac{r_0}{c} \frac{dE}{E} + \left[\frac{1}{c} + \frac{r_0}{c} c'(r_0) \log \left(\frac{p_{\min} c}{r_0 - c} \right) \right] dr$$

$$\frac{r_0}{c} c'(r_0) = -\frac{1}{r_0}$$

postulating that p is not influenced by variations of r

Public acceptance rules

$$\sum_{i=1}^n (g_i - \lambda_i \mu_{oi})$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^n g_i = g$$

$$g_1/\mu_{o1} = g_2/\mu_{o2} = \dots = g_n/\mu_{on}$$

$$(g_i - \lambda_i \mu_{oi})\rho \geq \lambda_i \mu_{pi}$$

$$\frac{\lambda_i \mu_{oi}}{g_i} \leq \left(1 + \frac{1}{\rho} \frac{\mu_{pi}}{\mu_{oi}}\right)^{-1}$$

A model for determining dE and dr generated by an accident

$$L = \begin{cases} \min\{X, Y\} \\ Y \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad L_h = \begin{cases} R \min\{X, Y\} & \text{both with probability } P_f \\ RY - T \mathbf{1}_{X < Y} & \text{both with probability } 1 - P_f \end{cases}$$

$$E[\mathbf{1}_{X < Y}] = P(X < Y) = \kappa E$$

$$E[L] = P_f \frac{1}{\kappa} \int_0^{\infty} (1 - e^{-\kappa t}) f_Y(t) dt + (1 - P_f) E[Y]$$

$$E[L_h] = r E[L] - (1 - P_f) E[T] E[\mathbf{1}_{X < Y}] = (r + dr) E$$

$$\frac{E[Y] - E[L]}{\kappa E[L]^2} \rightarrow P_f \frac{1}{2} (1 + V_Y^2) \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{dE}{E} \approx -P_f \frac{1}{2} (1 + V_Y^2) \kappa E$$

$$dr = -(1 - P_f) \kappa E[T]$$

Distribution on accident categories

N_i persons are assigned to category $i = 1, \dots, n$

$$N_1 + \dots + N_n = N$$

$$N dp = N_1(dp)_1 + \dots + N_n(dp)_n$$

time allocation per accident suffering person in category i

$$\frac{(dp)_i}{\kappa_i} = \frac{r_0}{c} \frac{1}{2} (1 + V_Y^2) E p_{\min} P_{fi} + \left[\frac{1}{c} + \frac{1}{r_0} \log \left(\frac{r_0 - c}{p_{\min} c} \right) \right] E[T_i] p_{\min} (1 - P_{fi})$$

Example: Ferry on fire

$$\frac{\lambda_i \mu_{oi}}{g_i} \leq \left(1 + \frac{1}{\rho} \frac{\mu_{pi}}{\mu_{oi}} \right)^{-1}$$

$$\frac{1.2 \cdot 10^{-2} \cdot 0.0246}{0.3 \cdot 3.075} = 3.20 \cdot 10^{-3} \leq \left(1 + \frac{1}{\rho} \frac{22.2 - 0.0246}{0.0246} \right)^{-1} = 3.32 \cdot 10^{-3}$$



waste of your valuable time?

Results: The annual frequency of fire in Scandinavian waters is estimated to $\kappa = 1.2 \cdot 10^{-2} \text{ y}^{-1}$. Given the occurrence of a fire estimates of the probability of a fatal accident and of injury is $P_f = 7.85 \cdot 10^{-3}$ and $P_i = 0.214$, respectively. Thus, the probability is 0.778 that the fire occurrence does not harm an arbitrary passenger or crew member. Conditional on injury the expected recovery time is estimated to $E[T | \text{injury}] = 0.27 \text{ y}$. Hence, $E[T] = (0.778 \cdot 0 + 0.214 \cdot 0.27)/(0.778 + 0.214) = 0.059 \text{ y} = 22 \text{ days}$. Inserting these values into (19) and using $c = 0.084$, $p_{\min} = 1.81$, $r_0 = 0.95$, $E = 80 \text{ y}$, and $V_Y = 0.2$, the two terms in (19) become $dp_f/\kappa = 6.68 \text{ y}$ and $dp_i/\kappa = 1.34 \text{ y}$. Multiplying these by $S = GDP/p_{\min} = 33,340/1.81 = 18,420 \text{ €/y}$ their monetary equivalents are 0.123 mill € and 0.0248 mill €, respectively. Thus the societal cost of an injury is about 20% of the cost of a fatality. For $N = 150$ passengers the total expected socio-economic loss of life and limb per fire becomes $150 \cdot (0.123 + 0.025) = 22.2 \text{ mill €}$.

The owner loss expectations are estimated to 100.000 € / fatality and 4.000 € / injury. The expected owner loss due to fatalities and injuries caused by a fire occurrence is thus $\mu_o = (7.85 \cdot 10^{-3} \cdot 0.1 + 0.214 \cdot 0.004) \cdot 150 = 0.0246 \text{ mill €}$. The total annual gain before tax for the RoRo-ferry is 3.075 mill € / y of which 30% is allocated to cover the fire risk. Inserting these values into the acceptance rule (13) using $\rho = 0.3$ gives

$$\frac{1.2 \cdot 10^{-2} \cdot 0.0246}{0.3 \cdot 3.075} = 3.20 \cdot 10^{-3} \leq \left(1 + \frac{1}{\rho} \frac{22.2 - 0.0246}{0.0246}\right)^{-1} = 3.32 \cdot 10^{-3} \quad (20)$$

Thus the public acceptance criterion (13) is satisfied. For $\rho = 1$ the criterion is the so-called LQI (or LQTAI) criterion which is less restrictive than if $\rho < 1$. For $\rho = 1$ the right side of (20) becomes $1.10 \cdot 10^{-2}$.

Nature preservation willingness index

$$W(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = I(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) W$$

$$W = \text{GDP} \times Q$$

$$Q = T/E$$

$$dp/p = -dQ/Q$$

$$d[I(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})p] = -I(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})p dQ/Q$$

$$\mu_p = \gamma^{-1} (1 - e^{-\gamma E |dQ|}) p_{\min} \frac{|dQ|}{Q} \int_{\text{all } \mathbf{x}} d(\mathbf{x}) I[\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}_0(\mathbf{x})] d\mathbf{x}$$

$$I(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \exp[-|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}|^2 / (2\sigma^2)]$$